The compression feature of compressed sensing (CS) enables that the ciphertext lengths of multimedia encryption schemes have reduced dramatically, and the simple linear measurements make the encryption process extremely efficient. Therefore, CS based image encryption schemes have attached wide attentions in recent years. However, almost all CS based image encryption schemes follow the framework of symmetric encryption. In this paper, we propose the first CS based public key image encryption scheme PKIE-CS with accurate decryption. As is known to all, two important conditions for successful signal reconstruction in CS are signal sparsity and measurement matrix satisfying some properties (e.g., restricted isometry property). In our scheme, the relationship between the public key and the secret key can be expressed by B P [T; I] = A T P, where B P and A are public parameters, T is the secret key, and B P can not be used as the measurement matrix in CS. Thus, anyone can not extract the secret key T from public key. We first give the specific descriptions of PKIE-CS and then give some theoretical analysis for providing strong security evidence. Last, the experimental results and the comparison with similar works demonstrate the feasibility and the superiority of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Based on sparse representations of signals, a famous signal sampling theory, called compressed sensing (CS), has been presented approximately fifteen years ago [1] - [3] . As is well known, the traditional method for signal processing follows the ''sample-then-compress'' framework, i.e., some redundant information is sampled first and then discarded. The CS-based method integrates signal sampling and compression processes simultaneously, and thus it requires few number of samplings than the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem requires [4] , [5] . Since CS provides an efficient data compression-reconstruction framework, it has been widely applied in many other fields such as medical imaging [6] , wireless communication [7] , quantum tomography [8] , deep learning [9] and image cryptography [10] , [11] .
The main reasons why CS-based multimedia encryption schemes have attracted increasing attention recently can be The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Haiyong Zheng. summarized into the following three aspects. First of all, the lengths of ciphertexts are smaller than those of plaintexts. What's more, CS-based encryption schemes can directly act on the plaintext, and some traditional cryptographic encryption schemes (e.g., DES and AES) are bit-level data processing approaches. It is very time-consuming for multimedia plaintexts (e.g., image and video). Finally, CS-based encryption schemes has the anti-noise capability that traditional cryptographic schemes do not have.
Up to now, almost all proposed CS-based encryption schemes follow the framework described in Fig. 1 , where the measurement matrix plays the role of the private key in this cryptosystem. This encryption model is very simple, and the efficiency of encryption process is very high because it just requires one matrix multiplication. However, this simple linear encryption system has been questioned intuitively from a cryptographic perspective. Fortunately, previous studies provide sufficient theoretical evidence to guarantee the computational security of this model. The secrecy properties was analyzed by Rachlin and Baron [12] , and they found that using the wrong measurement matrix will lead to the failure of decryption with probability one. In addition, they proved that this simple architecture can achieve computational secrecy. Although the Shannon-sense perfect secrecy is not achievable in this model [12] , Hossein et al. proved that a weaker sense perfect secrecy may be achieved under some assumptions [13] . In 2013, Mayiami et al. analyzed the required conditions that the CS-based encryption model achieves perfect secrecy [14] . The results show that if the number of source messages goes to infinity and the number of measurements is more than two times of the sparsity level, the Shannon-sense perfect secrecy is achievable when the measurement matrix satisfies the restricted isometery property. From the perspective of cryptanalysis, Orsdemir et al. investigate the security of CS-based cryptosystem against brute-force attack and structured attack [15] . They pointed out that the computational complexity of these attacks render them infeasible in practice.
The above-mentioned theoretical results provide the basic security guarantee for constructing CS-based cryptographic schemes. A large number of CS-based encryption schemes have been presented in recent years. In 2015, Cambareri et al. introduced a multiclass CS-based encryption model [11] , where high-class receivers were given a complete private key and lower-class receivers were given an incomplete key (i.e., a partially corrupted measurement matrix). In 2016, a new encryption framework by embedding some cryptographic features in CS for improving the security of CS-based encryption schemes was proposed by Zhang et al. [16] . To achieve the probabilistic encryption system, Fay introduced the counter mode of operation to CS-based encryptions [17] , which was provably secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. For images, some CS-based encryption schemes have been introduced in recent years [18] - [22] . These schemes have some common advantages, such as short ciphertext length and high efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge, almost all existing CS-based encryption schemes belong to the category of symmetric cryptography. Namely, the encrypter and the decrypter possess a measurement matrix as the private key before secure communication. Although symmetric cryptosystem has some advantages in efficiency compared with asymmetric cryptosystem, it also has several drawbacks from the perspective of cryptography. On the one hand, any two communication parties should share an measurement matrix (or a chaotic seed for generating the matrix) according to some key agreement protocols before communication. For a network consisting of n users, each party needs to store n − 1 private keys, and the total number of keys (TNK) in this network is C 2 n (see Fig. 2a ). Note that in public key systems, each party just only store one private key and TNK = 2n (see Fig. 2b ). On the other hand, CS-based symmetric cryptosystems can not directly provide some other security services (e.g., authentication and nonrepudiation). And these services can be achieved using asymmetric cryptosystem.
In this paper, we present a method for constructing public key image encryption (PKIE) scheme based on CS. The main contribution of this work can be summarized as follows:
• First, we introduce the formal definition of PKIE according to the definition of public key encryption. According to this architecture, we establish the relationship between the public key and the secret key through a simple system of underdetermined linear equations. The problem of finding private keys from public keys is equivalent to the reconstruction step of CS when using non-measurement matrices.
• Furthermore, we describe our PKIE-CS, which is a probabilistic encryption system. A number of experimental analysis are given, such as correctness verification, pixel correlation analysis and key sensitive analysis. In addition, security analysis indicate that PKIE-CS can resist ciphertext-only attack and known-plaintext attack.
• Last, to verify the efficiency of PKIE-CS, we provide a performance comparison between PKIE-CS and several related works. The results show that when the sizes of plaintext images does not exceed 1024 * 1024, the encryption and decryption time of PKIE-CS is much less than those of the classical public key algorithm RSA. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II recalls some basic definitions of CS and public key cryptosystem. We will describe the formal definition of PKIE and the proposed PKIE-CS explicitly in Section III and IV. In Section V, some experiments are carried out to show the feasibility of the proposed scheme. Section VI gives the security analysis from a cryptographic perspective. Section VII introduces the performance comparison with similar works. Finally we conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. PREMILINARIES A. COMPRESSED SENSING
The sparsity of natural signals is a necessary condition for perfect reconstruction in CS. Previous works have shown that VOLUME 7, 2019 some natural signals can be represented using only a few nonzero coefficients in a suitable basis or dictionary [23] , [24] .
Definition 1 [1] - [3] : A vector x ∈ R n is called k-sparse if at most k of its entries are nonzero, i.e., x 0 ≤ k.
Similarly, we give the definition of the sparsity of matrices.
To compress a k-sparse vector x ∈ R n , the compression process of CS can be expressed by the following underdetermined linear system:
where A ∈ R m×n (m < n) and y ∈ R m denote the measurement matrix and the measurement values, respectively. Evidently, it is impossible to directly reconstruct x from y because there are infinitely many solutions for Eq. (1). Due to the sparsity of x, Donoho and Elad introduced the concept of spark, and gave the condition of the uniqueness of sparse solution [25] .
Definition 3 [25] : For a matrix A, the spark of A is the smallest number of columns of A that are linearly dependent.
Lemma 1 [25] : For any measurement vector y ∈ R m , there exists at most one k-sparse signal x such that y = Ax if and only if spark(A) > 2k.
A straightforward approach to obtain the k-sparse vector x from Eq. (1) can be viewed as the following l 0 optimization problem
Since finding the sparse solution to this optimization problem is in general NP-hard [1] , A satisfying the condition of Lemma 1 is impracticable. Candès and Tao proposed a classic criterion for constructing measurement matrix, i.e., restricted isometry property (RIP) [1] , [3] .
Definition 4: A matrix A satisfies the RIP of order k if there exists a δ k ∈ (0, 1) such that
holds for all k-sparse vector x.
Because of the convex property of l 1 norm, a practical reconstruction method used in CS is to replace x 0 with x 1 , i.e.,
If δ 2k < √ 2 − 1, the solution to the l 1 problem is that of the l 0 problem [3] . In addition to l 1 -based reconstruction algorithms, many greedy algorithms, such as orthogonal matching pursuit [26] , StOMP [27] and CoSaMP [28] , have been proposed for the sparse signal reconstruction.
Thus, matrices satisfying the RIP can be used as measurement matrices in CS. In fact, matrices satisfying the RIP can be divided into two categories: random measurement matrices and deterministic measurement matrices. Previous studies have proved that when m = O(k log(n/k)), a Gaussian matrix satisfied the RIP with overwhelming probability [29] , [30] . Similar to a Gaussian matrix, a Bernoulli matrix or a random discrete Fourier transform matrix can also be used as measurement matrix [30] . The typical representative of deterministic construction method is chaotic matrices [31] - [33] . Yu et al. have proven that their constructed Logistic matrices satisfy the RIP with overwhelming probability if the sparsity k ≤ O(m/ log(n/k)).
Lemma 2 [31] : Chaotic measurement matrix A ∈ R m×n constructed by the logistic map satisfies the RIP for constant δ k > 0 with overwhelming probability providing that k ≤ O(m/ log(n/k)).
While the RIP guarantees recovery of k-sparse signals, verifying that a general matrix A satisfies the RIP has a combinatorial computational complexity. In many cases it is preferable to use properties of A that are easily computable to provide more concrete recovery guarantees. The coherence of a matrix is one such property. The coherence µ(A) of a matrix A is the largest absolute normalized inner product between any two columns of A:
Definition 5:
where a i denotes the i-th column of A.
B. PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
Here we recall the standard definition of public key encryption scheme [34] . Definition 6: A public key encryption scheme PKE is a tuple (KeyGen, Enc, Dec), such that • KeyGen(1 λ ) is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that takes a security parameter λ and outputs a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk).
• Enc pk (m) is a PPT algorithm that takes a public key pk, a message m and outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec sk (c) is an efficient deterministic algorithm taking as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs a plaintext m. The correctness of a PKE scheme can be defined as follows:
Definition 7: A public key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is correct, if it holds for all plaintexts m that Pr Dec sk Enc pk (m) = m : (pk, sk) = KeyGen 1 λ < negl(λ), (6) where negl(λ) represents a negligible function.
III. FORMAL DEFINITION OF PKIE
Def. 6 introduces the traditional concept of PKE, in which the plaintext m in general is a bit string or a value. Here we extend the above definitions and give the formal definition of PKIE. (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) , such that • KeyGen(1 λ ) is a PPT algorithm that takes a securityparameter λ and outputs a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk).
Definition 8: A public key image encryption scheme PKIE is a tuple
• Enc pk (X) is a PPT algorithm that takes a public key pk, a plaintext image X and outputs a ciphertext image C.
• Dec sk (C) is a deterministic algorithm taking as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext image C, and outputs a plaintext image X. Similarly, the correctness of a PKIE scheme can be defined as follows:
Definition 9: A public key image encryption scheme PKIE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is correct, if it holds for all plaintext images X that Pr Dec sk (Enc pk (X)) = X : (pk, sk) = KeyGen 1 λ < negl(λ). (7) where negl(λ) represents a negligible function.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
We will describe our scheme in this subsection.
1) KEY GENERATION
We assume that the sizes of plaintext images is m × m. Then the key generation algorithm KeyGen can be described as folllows:
• Generate a ''non-measurement'' matrix B 1 ∈ R m×n 1 and a k-sparse matrix T ∈ R n 1 ×n 2 , where n 2 = O(k log(m/k)) < m < n 1 and n 1 + n 2 = n. Here we say a matrix is non-measurement if it can not be used as the measurement matrix. To do this, it can set µ(B 1 ) = 1.
• Compute B 2 = −B 1 T ∈ R m×n 2 and chose a measurement matrix A ∈ R n 2 ×m .
• Choose a traditional PKE (e.g., RSA) and generate a pair keys (pk 1 ,sk 1 ).
• Output the public key pk 2 = {pk 1 , B 1 , B 2 , A} and the secret key sk 2 = {sk 1 , T}.
2) ENCRYPTION
Given a plaintext image X ∈ R m×m , the Enc algorithm works as follows:
• Choose an invertible matrix P ∈ R n 2 ×n 2 at random, and compute
• Choose an initial value x 0 of the logistic map at random, and produce the corresponding chaotic matrix S ∈ R p×p (p > n). Then compute the QR decomposition of S and obtain
where S 1 ∈ R p×n , S 2 ∈ R p×(p−n) , and R T
• Choose two random values α, β with β > α and a ''noise'' matrix E ∈ R (p−n)×m .
• Encrypt α and x 0 using PKE and get the corresponding ciphertext c = Enc pk 1 (α x 0 ).
• Output the ciphertext C = (c, P, Y).
3) DECRYPTION
The Dec algorithm takes the ciphertext C and the secret key T as inputs, and works as follows:
• Using the reconstruction algorithm of CS to get the sparse matrix X * s . Specifically,
where ∈ R m×m is the orthogonal discrete wavelet transformation (DWT) matrix.
• Through the anti-sparsification transformation, output the decrypted image
Remark 1: We require that compared with α, the parameter β should be large enough. The purpose of doing so is to use uniform noise to mask plaintext information. Thus the pixels of ciphertext are uniformly distributed.
Remark 2: The relationship between the public key and the secret key is [B 1 ||B 2 + A T P] T I = A T P. Anyone can not extract any information of T from the public key because the equation is underdetermined and [B 1 ||B 2 + A T P] can not be used as the measurement matrix in CS. The traditional PKE is used here for improve the security of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1: If all plaintext images are k-sparse, m = O(k log(n 2 /k)), and A is a measurement matrix, then the proposed PKIE-CS is correct.
Proof: Since
VOLUME 7, 2019 where X s is the sparse image of X. From Eqs. (12) and (13), thus X * s = X s and X * = X.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first perform some experiments to demonstrate the feasibility of our scheme. What's more, the correlation analysis implies that our scheme can resist some statistical attacks. Finally, we prove the property of key sensitivity. Namely, we analyze the security if there exists an attack who guesses the private keys used in our scheme.
A. CORRECTNESS VERIFICATION
Given two images X ∈ R n×m and X * ∈ R n×m , the mean square error are defined as
where x ij and x * ij denote the (i, j) entity of X and X * , respectively. Based on MSE, we use the classic index, peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), to evaluate the quality of the decrypted images. The PSNR (in dB) between X and X * is defined as PSNR = 10 log 10 (max X 2 /MSE X,X * ), (16) where max X and MSE X,X * , respectively, stand for the maximum possible pixel value of X and the mean square error between X and X * . For verifying the correctness, we consider two different sizes of plaintext images in Fig. 3 , i.e., Lena (256 × 256), Plane (256×256), Pepper (512×512), and Earth (512×512). For Lena and Plane, we set n 1 = 300, n 2 = 200, p = 600, k = 100, and the measurement matrix A is produced using the Logistic map with initial value 0.793 and the gap 98 according to the method in [31] . For Pepper and Earth, we set n 1 = 600, n 2 = 250, p = 900, k = 100, and the measurement matrix A is Gaussian random matrix [29] , [30] . In all experiments, α = 10 −7 and β = 10 4 . The experimental results provide sufficient evidences to prove the correctness of the proposed PKIE-CS. 
B. PIXEL CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The adjacent pixels in most nature images are highly correlated to each other. To resist some statistical attacks, encryption schemes require that the correlation between two adjacent pixels of ciphertexts should be low enough. For a given image data, the correlation coefficient of L pairs of two adjacent pixels is defined as
where {(x i , y i )} L i=1 denote L pairs of two adjacent pixels (in horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions) that we selected randomly in the image,
To measure the correlations between two adjacent pixels in the horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions, 80000 pairs of adjacent pixels are selected randomly from the plaintext image and the corresponding ciphertext image. All the parameters in Table 1 and Fig. 4 are the same as those in Fig. 3 except α and β. Here we set α = 3 × 10 −7 and β = 7000. The correlation coefficients of the four plaintext and ciphertext images in horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions are showed in Table 1 . Fig. 4(a) , (b) and (c) show the correlations of Pepper in the horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions. And, Fig. 4(d) , (e) and (f) are the correlations of the ciphertext Pepper. Similarly, Fig. 4 (g)-(l) are the correlations of Earth and the related ciphertext image. Table 1 indicates that the correlation coefficients of the ciphertext images are evidently smaller than those of the plaintext images. In general, Fig. 4 also provides evidences to prove that the pixels in the ciphertext images are more uncorrelated than the pixels in the plaintext images.
C. KEY SPACE ANALYSIS
Alvarez and Li indicated that for resisting the brute-force attack, the key space of a secure image encryption scheme is considered to be at least 2 100 [35] . The secret key of the proposed scheme consists of two parts, i.e., the secret key sk 1 of the traditional PKE and the matrix T ∈ R n 2 ×n 2 . The IEEE floating-point standard suggested that the precision of the double-precision value is approximately 10 −15 . Note that the number of the elements in the proposed scheme is n 2 2 +1, where n 2 = O(k log(m/k)) and m is the size of the plaintext images. Thus the value of the key space of the proposed scheme is 10 n 2 2 +1 . In Fig. 3 , n 2 = 200 for 256 × 256 images and n 2 = 250 for 512 × 512 images. Evidently, the value of the key space is much greater than 2 100 . In general, the proposed CS-based PKIE meets the security demand of key space.
D. KEY SENSITIVE ANALYSIS
In general, a symmetric cryptosystem possesses the property of key sensitivity if it satisfies two conditions. One is that slightly different keys to encrypt the same plaintext image will produce completely different ciphertexts. The other one is that the cipher image can not be decrypted when using a wrong key, even tiny difference between the encryption and decryption keys. Since the proposed scheme is a public key encryption scheme, it is inappropriate to encrypt the same plaintext image using different public keys. Fortunately, the proposed scheme is a probabilistic encryption system, and we will test the first case of key sensitivity using the same public key twice for the same plaintext image. In Fig. 5 , we set n 1 = 290, n 2 = 180, n = 470, p = 560 and k = 80. In the first case of key sensitivity experiment (Figs. 5(a)-(d)), α = 10 −7 and β = 10 4 . In the second case (Figs. 5(e)-(h)), α = 10 −3 and β = 20. A is Gaussian measurement matrix, and the initial value of the logistic map x 0 = 0.51. Fig. 5(b) describes the ciphertext image when x 0 = 0.51. Using the same public key, we slightly change x 0 into 0.51 + 10 −15 . The resulted ciphertext image are shown in Fig. 5 (c). The differential image between Fig. (b) and Fig. (c) are shown in Fig. 5(d) . Thus, in the encryption step of PKIE-CS, using the same public key twice for the same plaintext will obtain completely different ciphertexts. Fig. 5(f) shows the decrypted cipher image when using the correct secret key T. Fig. 5(g) gives the corresponding decrypted image when using the modified key T + 10 −5 E 1 , where all entities in E 1 ∈ R n 1 ×n 2 are 1. The reconstructed image is introduced in Fig. 5(h) using the secret key [10 −15 E 2 ||T 1 ], where E 2 ∈ R n 1 is all 1 vector and T 1 ∈ R n 1 ×(n 2 −1) is the matrix formed from the 2-th to n 2 -th columns. The experimental results show that slightly incorrect secret keys lead to complete failure of decryption.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. EXTRACTING INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC KEYS
As a PKIE scheme, the basic requirement is that any adversary A can not extract any information about the secret key from the public key. In the proposed PKIE-CS, the public key contains four parts, and pk 1 and A are independent of the private key T. However, B 2 = −B 1 T, thus A may attempt to extract T from B 1 and B 2 . Evidently, A can not obtain T by solving linear equations because of m < n 1 . From another perspective, A try to exploit the sparsity of T and use some CS reconstruction algorithms to solve this underdetermined linear equations. To verify whether the CS reconstruction algorithms work, here we define an index. Giving two matrices T ∈ R n 1 ×n 2 and T * ∈ R n 1 ×n 2 , the error rate with non-zero entities between T and T * are defined as
where sgn describes the symbol function. The parameter settings in Fig. 6 are exactly the same as those in Fig. 3 .
The results indicate that whatever k is, A can not obtain the private key T through some CS-based reconstruction algorithms. Theoretically, this method does not work because of µ(B 1 ) = 1.
B. CIPHERTEXT-ONLY ATTACK AND KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK
In cryptanalysis, ciphertext-only attack (COA) means that A has a set of ciphertexts. In our scheme, the ciphertext contains the random matrix P and A can compute B P using the public key. However, if the PKE is secure, A can not decrypt Enc pk 1 (α||x 0 ) because of lacking sk 1 . From Eq. (10), we can conclude that A can not exact any information of plaintext image from the ciphertext C. Furthermore, even if A gets α and x 0 in some way, he still can not get the plaintext. The experimental results in Figs. 5(g) and (h) show that even if the difference between the guessing secret key and the true value is very small, A still can not get the plaintext. Known-plaintext attack (KPA) assume that A is able to obtain a set of plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts. Furthermore, chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) allows A to choose a set of plaintexts himself and can get the ciphertexts using the encryption oracle. In fact, the traditional CS-based symmetric cryptosystem (see Fig. 1 ) can not resist CPA because A can extract the secret matrix A using an identity matrix as the selected plaintext. The proposed scheme is a probabilistic encryption system. That is to say, PKIE-CS never returns the same ciphertext twice for the same plaintext image. These random parameters such as P, α and x 0 helps PKIT resist KPA and COA.
VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In terms of the total entities of secret keys (TESK), decryption time, and the encryption method, we provide a simple comparison between our scheme and some typical image encryption scheme in this section, including several CS-based symmetric encryptions [13] , [17] , [37] and the famous RSA system [38] . In these CS-based symmetric schemes [13] , [17] , [37] , the measurement matrices serve as the private key. We assume that there exist N users in this system, and the measurement matrices in these schemes are all produced by chaotic systems. Thus, the TESK of these schemes are C 2 N . However, the TNSK of the asymmetric RSA algorithm and PKIE-CS are N and (n 1 n 2 + 1)N . When N > 2n 1 n 2 +3, (n 1 n 2 +1)N < C 2 N . Thus, the proposed PKIE-CS has smaller TESK when there are more than 2n 1 n 2 + 3 users in the system.
For convenience, T CS R stands for the reconstruction time using the certain CS reconstruction algorithm. Evidently, the decryption time of the straight-forward CS-based encryption model is equal to T CS R . Here we suppose that the information receiver use RSA algorithm to decrypt each pixel in turn, thus the decryption time is m 2 T ME , where T ME stands for the modular exponential time and m is the dimension of the plaintext. In PKIE-CS, the main time-consuming operation is reconstruction algorithm. In addition, the matrix inverse and matrix multiplication operations are needed in our decryption step. Specifically, we have performed the encryption and decryption time for plaintext images with different sizes. Fig. 7 describes the ratio of the execution time between the RSA algorithm and the proposed scheme. The experimental results indicate that if the dimensions of images are smaller than 1024 × 1024, both the encryption and decryption time ratios T RSA /T PKIE−CS are greater than 1. That is to say, the encryption and decryption time of the proposed scheme is faster than those of the classical RSA scheme.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Based on CS, this paper presents a framework for constructing public key image encryption scheme. Through an underdetermined linear system, we built the internal connection between the public keys and the private keys. It is not feasible for any adversary to extract information from the public keys because the reconstruction algorithms of CS can not work when using non-measurement matrices. The experimental results indicate the infeasibility and high security of the proposed scheme. The performance comparison shows that PKIE-CS is superior to RSA in the efficiency of encryption and decryption. Our future research will focus on reducing the length of ciphertexts and constructing provable security schemes.
